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13 Purpose – This paper aims to examine the compliance status of Islamic banks in Bangladesh with 
14 Shari'ah-based accounting standards named Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) standard-4 




Design/methodology/approach – The six years of secondary data, including the annual reports 
21 
22 
of 2013-2018, were collected from the websites of all the seven listed Islamic banks, i.e., 100% of 
23 the population available during the period of study. The study employed a content analysis
24 
approach for systematically categorizing and analyzing the contents disclosed in the annual
26 
report. A total compliance score (TCS) based on 133 reporting items of IFSB standard-4 were27 
28 considered for content analysis. Furthermore, the study applied the ordinary least square (OLS)
29 
to investigate the impact of corporate governance on IFSB standard-4. 
31 
32 
Findings– The study found that the level of compliance with the IFSB standard by the Islamic 33 
34 banks in Bangladesh is poor, as the overall compliance status is 44.83 percent. Further, the study 
36 observed a significant and positive influence of the Shari'ah supervisory committee, the board size, 
37 
38 accounting experts on the board, foreign ownership, and institutional ownership on the level of 
39 compliance with IFSB standard-4. On the other hand, the study found a negative effect of directors'




Practical implications- The study provides the management of Islamic banks an insight into 
46 
47 
developing their governance characteristics to comply with Islamic accounting and reporting 
48 standards. Moreover, the study expects to facilitate the management of Islamic banks in designing 
49 
their accounting and reporting outlines to enhance the level of compliance with the IFSB standards. 
51 
52 Originality/value: This pioneering study on IFSB standards opens an avenue to the researchers 
53 
54 exploring the accounting and reporting status of Islamic banks considering the requirements of the 
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12 1. Introduction 
13 
14 Accounting is one of the widely used mechanisms of revealing the actual occurrence of an entity 
16 to its stakeholders. The mechanisms of accounting vary from country to country and organization 
17 
18 to organization due to educational, sociological, economic, political, legal, and technological 
19 factors despite widespread use to reveal the real performance of an entity to its stakeholders (Dima
21 et al., 2014). Moreover, profit motive and service orientation have significant dominance in the 
22 
23 accounting and reporting mechanism of the business organization (Ullah et al., 2018). Islamic 
24 banks operating in Bangladesh compulsorily apply some rules and regulations for accounting and
26 reporting purposes, such as the Companies Act, the Banking Companies Act, the Securities and 
27 
28 Exchange Commission rules and ordinance, and Bangladesh Bank circulars, IAS and IFRS. 
29 
However, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and Auditing 
31 Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) standards are not yet compulsory. 32 
33 Though the Islamic banks have been making a repeated appeal for the last four decades, no 
34 
independent body has been established in regulating Islamic banks in Bangladesh. Islamic banks 
36 
are governed by the same secular law, environment, and regulatory control as traditional interest-37 
38 
39 
based banks (Ullah, 2013). 
41 As more than 90% of Bangladesh's people are Muslims, mass people are highly interested in 
42 
Islamic banking. Currently, ten full-fledged Islamic banks are operating in Bangladesh, of which 43 
44 investment and deposit growth have become 13.61% and 15.05% respectively from 2018 to 2019 
46 (Rashid et al., 2020a). As a significant part of the stakeholders of the Islamic banks are Muslims, 
47 
48 they need some information about whether the banks are disclosing informatio  as per IFSB 
49 standards. IFSB-4 focuses on the Disclosures to Promote Transparency and Market Discipline for 
51 Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services. The standard motivates the IFIs to disclose 
52 
53 necessary information, report fair-value of Zakatable assets such as inventories and refrain from
54 
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3 compliance status of their operations; and finally, manage the Shari'ah compliance risk (AOSSG, 
4 
2010). Therefore, Islamic banks require disclosing the information to facilitate the decision-
6 
7 making process of the Muslims. 
8 
9 
Although several studies including Grassa et al. (2018), Katmon et al. (2019), Elgattani & 
11 
12 Hussainey (2020) conducted their research on the relationship between corporate governance and 
13 
accounting reporting and disclosure, there is a dearth of research on the relationship between 14 
16 
international Islamic standards and corporate governance in Islamic banks. The scarcity of research 
17 on the association between corporate governance and IFSB standards-4 motivates this study. Based 
18 
19 on the literature, the study identifies the following two research questions: 
21 
22 RQ-1: What is the level of compliance with IFSB standard-4 by the Islamic banks in 
23 
24 Bangladesh? 
26 RQ-2: Whether corporate governance impact the level of compliance with IFSB standard-4? 
27 
28 
29 To find out the answer to the above questions, this study aims to measure the level of compliance 
31 with IFSB-4 and then investigate its association with the corporate governance of the Islamic banks 
32 
in Bangladesh. More specifically, the study contributes to the existing literature in the following 33 
34 ways. Firstly, the study extends the literature on accounting and reporting of Islamic banks by 
36 exploring the compliance with IFSB standard-4 and showing the features of corporate governance 
37 
38 that affect the level of compliance with that standard. Secondly, the study explores and extends a 
39 new avenue for the accounting and reporting researchers for further research. Finally, the study 
41 provides policymakers, management, and Shari'ah supervisory committee an insight into 
42 





48 The remainder of the paper has been organized as: Section 2 discusses the theoretical foundation 
49 
and bases of hypotheses development, Section 3 outlines the methodology of the study, Section 4 
51 
elaborates the findings of the study, Section 5 provides further discussions of the paper, and finally, 52 
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3 2. Theory and hypotheses development 
4 
2.1 Theoretical orientations 
6 
7 The stakeholder theory and agency theory are the two prominent theories used frequently in 
8 
9 accounting standards and corporate governance disclosure studies (Basiruddin & Ahmed, 2019). 
The stakeholder theory argues that the disclosure needs to satisfy the information required by 
11 
12 different stakeholders and explains how the management responds to them through accounting 
13 
reports (Freeman, 2010). Moreover, it explicates a relationship between the management and the 14 
16 
users of accounting information, including shareholders, creditors, suppliers, governments, and
17 different regulatory bodies. On the other hand, in order to reduce the information asymmetry gap, 
18 
19 the agency theory allows the management, as a dominant agent of the firms, to disclose more 
information voluntarily (Gul & Leung, 2004). Basiruddin & Ahmed (2019) argued that agency 21 
22 problem arises in Islamic banks in the long run when the goal of the board of directors (BOD), 
23 
24 managers and Shari'ah supervisory committee (SSC) are divergent. The shareholders aim to 
26 maximize profit by enhancing performance and expanding the business by attracting customers. 
27 Simultaneously, the SSC and management of the banks would like to ensure Shari'ah compliance 28 
29 to meet the expectation of the majority of the customers who deal with Islamic banks only for 
31 religious restrictions. This dilemma among the management and shareholders can lead to the 
32 
agency problem. 33 
34 
36 Moreover, as per the stakeholder-agency perspective, the conflicts between the management and 
37 
38 stakeholders as to the voluntary disclosure can be reduced if manager decisions are allied with 
39 stakeholders' interests (Grassa et al., 2018). To mitigate these conflicts, the board composition and 
41 its sub-group always try to establish a good reputation as to their independence from management, 
42 
43 their guiding management and their work ethic (Armstrong et al., 2015). The board characteristics 
44 
including board size, its independence, financial experts on the board and audit committee, 
46 
47 
therefore, have been widely used in the disclosure research both theoretically and empirically 
48 (Armstrong et al., 2015). Moreover, the ownership structure comprised of directors, institutional 
49 
and foreign shares of Islamic banks tends to influence the managers to disclose more information 
51 
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2 
3 2.2 Hypotheses development
4 
2.2.1 Shari'ah supervisory committee (SSC) 
6 
7 The Shari'ah board (also Shari'ah supervisory board or Advisory board) is known as SSC in 
8 
9 Bangladesh. SSC is formed with different dignitaries like Mawlana (religious leader), Mufti 
(Islamic scholar), professor, Ph.D. holder; barrister, economists, financial experts and bankers 
11 
12 (Ahmed & Khatun, 2013). The primary purpose of forming the board is to provide the stakeholders
13 
with a guarantee of conformity with Shari'ah rules and principles. Therefore, the SSC plays a14 
16 
crucial role in advising the board of directors on the Shari'ah matters, which enable the Islamic
17 financial institutions (IFIs) to comply with the Shari'ah rules. The SSC also oversees whether the 
18 
19 IFIs comply with the policies, procedures and standards issued by international Islamic institutions 
like AAOIFS and IFSB (Mollah & Zaman, 2015). The large SSC might influence the management 21 
22 in monitoring the IFIs towards "full disclosure" with compliance with the Shari'ah principles and 
23 
24 standards. The prior studies argued that large SSC influences positively the quality of disclosure 
26 of IFIs (Basiruddin & Ahmed, 2019; Grassa et al., 2018). 
27 On the other hand, the focus on the assumption that the quality of communication, coordination of 28 
29 activities and decision making between larger groups are more complicated and expensive than in 
31 smaller groups. Moreover, the costs outweigh the benefits of getting more people in SSC to rely 
32 
on (Grassa, 2016). Nevertheless, El-Halaby & Hussainey (2016) found a significant and positive 33 
34 impact of SSB size on the aggregate disclosure of Shari'ah, social and financial reporting. Besides, 
36 the combination of their expertise improves the BOD and other committees' oversight activities, 
37 
38 which, in turn, enables the banks to ensure compliance with IFSB standards-4. Therefore, the study 
39 posits the hypothesis. 
41 H1: There is a significant and positive relationship between the larger SSC and the level of 
42 
43 compliance with IFSB-4. 
44 
46 2.2.2. Board size 
47 
48 Among the board compositions, the banks' larger board size could help increase the corporate 
49 disclosure level as a larger board of directors gathers diversified knowledge and skills (Grassa et 
51 al., 2018). As a result of the larger board size, the Islamic banks tend to be disclosed more 
52 
53 information in the annual reports and thereby comply with IFSB standard-4. Similarly, the prior 
54 
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2 
3 disclose information voluntarily in the annual reports (Grassa et al., 2018; Muttakin et al., 2015). 
4 
Based on the proverb, "too many cooks spoil the broth", Rashid et al. (2020b) have mentioned that 
6 
7 the accurate decision-making process may be hindered because of having too many board 
8 
9 members. Moreover, the Shari'ah compliance can hinder the way of achieving profit as the rules 
limit Islamic banks' markets and products; managers' remuneration can be affected due to low 
11 
12 profitability (Basiruddin & Ahmed, 2019). However, conducting a study in GCC banks, Grassa 
13 
(2016) found that there is a positive association between board size and the banks' corporate 14 
16 
disclosure. The analysis, therefore, posits the hypothesis as follows: 
17 H2: There is a significant and positive relationship between the board size and the level of 
18 
19 compliance with IFSB-4. 
21 
22 2.2.3 Board independence
23 
24 According to the stakeholder-agency principle, the independence of the board leads to better 
26 management and, thereby, to high disclosure standards. As per the agency theory, it is necessary 
27 to observe the activities of the board experts by the independent external member because of the 28 
29 nature of opportunistic behavior (Jahid et al. 2020; Pranata & Laela, 2020). The previous studies' 
31 findings suggest that a positive association between board independence and voluntary disclosure 
32 
(Katmon et al., 2019). Additionally, the theory suggests that a large number of independent 33 
34 directors enable the management to monitor its self-interest activities and, thus, may motivate the 
36 banks to disclose more information. Interestingly, some other studies found a negative impact of 
37 
38 board independence on Shari'ah non-compliant risk (Basiruddin & Ahmed, 2019) since the
39 inclusion of external directors requires additional costs for the company (Rashid et al., 2020b). 
41 Hence, it is necessary to examine the relationship between board independence and IFSB standard, 
42 
43 and the study assumes a positive relationship.  
44 
H3: There is a significant and positive relationship between board independence and the level of 
46 
47 
compliance with IFSB-4. 
48 
49 
2.2.4 Accounting experts on the board 
51 
In the present study, accounting experts on the board have professional degrees like CA and CMA 52 
53 or Ph.D. in accounting or finance. The board of directors must need good accounting knowledge 
54 
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1 
2 
3 The study of Basiruddin & Ahmed (2019) found that accounting experts in the Shari'ah committee 
4 
reduce the risk of non-compliance. On the other hand, Rashid et al. (2020b) documented that 
6 
7 accounting experts concentrate more on the profitability of a firm instead of sustainability and 
8 
9 hence, reduce the level of compliance with international standards. However, accounting experts 
on the board are thought to play a better role in monitoring and advising the banks' management 
11 
12 to report and disclose more information than the non-expert members (Armstrong et al., 2015). 
13 
Therefore, the study projects the following hypothesis. 14 
16 
H4: There is a significant and positive relationship between the accounting expert on the board 
17 and the level of compliance with IFSB standard-4. 
18 
19 
21 2.2.5 Audit quality 
22 Audit plays a pivotal role in supervising, monitoring, and directing a firm's management to 
23 
24 implement an accounting control system to prepare financial statements (Zalata et al., 2018). To 
26 enhance information transparency, the firm requires qualified auditors to ensure its efficiency, 
27 resulting in better accounting standards (Grassa, 2016). Similarly, Elgattani & Hussainey (2020)28 
29 found the size of the audit committee as a crucial factor of AAOIFI governance disclosure in 
31 Islamic Banks. The study, therefore, posits a positive relationship between audit quality and IFSB 
32 
standard-4.33 
34 H5: There is a significant and positive relationship between audit quality and the level of 
36 compliance with IFSB-4. 
37 
38 
39 2.2.6 Ownership structure 
41 According to stakeholder theory, ownership structure influences the management to ensure 
42 
43 stockholders' protection. Therefore, the study examines the impact of foreign directors and 
44 
institutional ownership on compliance with IFSB standard-4 as they hold a significant portion of 
46 
47 
shares of the Islamic banks in Bangladesh. 
48 
49 
2.2.6.1 Foreign ownership 
51 
Prior studies found that foreign owners are at an information gap about the institutions compared 52 
53 to domestic owners, which leads them to create pressure managers to disclose more quality 
54 
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2 
3 as the sign of transparency of firms, Mi Choi et al. (2012) highlighted that foreign shareholders 
4 
play a crucial role in ensuring the quality of the information to strengthen their position to influence 
6 
7 the board. The higher the percentage of foreign ownership contributes to increased demand and 
8 
9 incentive for more quality information to be published, resulting in more incredible accounting 
information. Moreover, the foreigners purchase the shares with an expectation that Islamic banks 
11 
12 must follow the Shari'ah principles in their operations, enhancing the level of compliance with 
13 
Islamic accounting standards. Therefore, the study hypothesizes the following: 14 
16 
H6: Foreign ownership has a significant impact on the level of compliance with IFSB-4. 
17 
18 
19 2.2.6.2 Directors' ownership 
The board of directors is appointed to oversee the interest of the shareholders in the institutions. 21 
22 The ownership of directors also seeks to reap the advantages of their management effort for 
23 
24 shareholders. When the directors find that the assets held by them in more risk and possibility of 
26 loss, they can abuse their discretion more easily (Chen et al., 2008). On the contrary, when they 
27 find themselves as both owners and managers, it is easy for them to manage funds of the 28 
29 institutions and get more flexibility to take actions against shareholders' interests. These 
31 opportunities lead them not to disclose accurate information as required by the accounting 
32 
standards. So, the study puts forward the following hypothesis: 33 




39 2.2.6.3 Institutional ownership 
41 The study investigated the relationship between institutional ownership and the disclosure of IFSB 
42 
43 as the institutional shareholders play a significant role in monitoring the management of banks and 
44 
helping to disclose more details related to products and services that lead the business to better 
46 
47 
financial results (Grassa et al., 2018). In Saudi Arabia, Azid & Alnodel (2019) found that local 
48 financial institutions owned by non-governmental agencies are more likely to voluntarily reveal 
49 
their Shari'ah governance, especially from the banking sector. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
51 
is developed: 52 
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7 The study has used secondary data covering six years from 2013 to 2018 from the annual reports 
8 of all the seven (100%) listed Islamic banks available during the period of study in Bangladesh.9 
The study has used several years of data to check the compliance level in line with the prior studies 
11 
12 of Ullah et al. (2018) in Bangladesh from 2008 to 2012; Basiruddin & Ahmed (2019) in Malaysia
13 
and Indonesia over the period 2007-2017 and Grassa et al. (2018) in 11 countries from 2004 to 14 
2012. The listed Islamic banks in Bangladesh are Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL), Social 
16 
17 Islami Bank Limited (SIBL), Shahjalal Islami Bank Limited (SJIBL), Export-Import Bank of 
18 
19 Bangladesh Limited (EXIM), First Security Islami Bank Limited (FSIBL), Al-Arafah Islami Bank 
Limited (AIBL), and ICB Islami Bank Limited (ICBL). The study could not consider Union Bank 21 
22 Limited which started operation in the middle of 2013 and other three newly established/ converted 
23 



























Req. Items Category Req. 
Items 
1 Corporate Information 6 10 Liquidity Risk 4 
2 Capital Structure 6 11 Market Risk 4 
3 Capital Adequacy 8 12 Operational Risk 5 
4 Investment Accounts (both 
Unrestricted and Restricted 
Investment Account Holders (IAH) 
11 13 Rate of Return Risk 4 
5 Unrestricted Investment Accounts 18 14 Displaced Commercial Risk 7 
6 Restricted Investment Accounts 19 15 Contract-specific Risks 2 
7 General Disclosures 11 16 General Governance 
Disclosures 
6 
8 Credit Risk 10 17 Shari'ah Governance 
Disclosures 
6 
9 Credit Risk Mitigation 6 Total 133 
51 3.1.1 The Dependent Variable 
52 
53 The dependent variable used in this study is the Un-weighted Compliance Index (UCI). The UCI 
54 
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'0' if it does not comply across 133 items of IFSB standard-4 shown in Table 1 by following Ullah 
et al. (2018). The overall compliance score (TCS) would be determined as follows: 
n 
TCS = ci 
i1 
Where, c = 1 if item ci is disclosed and 0, otherwise 
n = number of items 
Table 2: Summary of variables and their measurement 
International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management Page 10 of 24 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name Variable description 
Dependent variable 
TCS Total compliance score Total compliance score with IFSB score of 6 years 
from 2013 to 2018 has been measured with UCI 
Independent variables 
SSC Shari'ah supervisory 
committee 
The number of members on the board of Shari'ah
supervisory committee 
BS Board size The number of total members on the board of directors 
IBM Independent board of 
director 
The number of independent members on the board of 
directors 
AE Accounting expert The number of board members who have a professional 
degree like CA, CMA or Ph.D. in the accounting field 
BIG4 Audit quality This is calculated as a dummy variable set to 1 if one of 
the BIG4 companies audits the bank and 0, otherwise. 
AC Audit committee The number of audit committee members 
FS Foreign share Percent of shares owned by foreign owners 
DS Director share Percent of shares owned by the board of directors 
IS Institutional share Percent of shares owned by institutions 
Control variables 
ROA Return on assets The ratio of net profit after tax (NPAT) to total assets 
over 2013 to 2018 
ROE Return on assets The ratio of NPAT to total equity over 2013 to 2018 
DG Deposit growth Percent of change in present year's deposit compared to 
the preceding year 
SIZE Bank size The logarithm of total assets 
LEV Leverage The ratio of total debts / total assets 
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1 
2 
3 3.1.2 Independent variables
4 
 The details of the independent variables are in Table 2. 
6 
7 3.1.3 Control variables 
8 
The study has used return on assets (ROA) and deposit growth as the indicator of financial 9 
performance measurement. According to signaling theory, firm financial performance has a 
11 
12 significant impact on the level of voluntary disclosure (Grassa et al., 2018; Muttakin et al., 2015). 
13 
14 The study also used the size of the bank and leverage as control variables considering the previous 
16 research related to disclosure (Katmon et al., 2019). 
17 
18 3.2 Model Specification 19 
In the model, the study includes the Shari'ah supervisory committee, the board size, independent 
21 
22 board members, accounting experts on the board, audit committee, and ownership structures as the
23 
24 characteristics of corporate governance to examine their impact on the level of compliance with 
IFSB-4.26 
27 
28 𝑇𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡29 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
31 
32 Where TCS = Un-weighted total compliance score per sample bank received.
33 α0 = the constant 
34 εit = the error term 
36 β1 to 𝛽13 = the coefficients of the variables defined in Table 2, and 
37 
38 
               'i' and 't' = the number of banks and period respectively. 
39 
3.3 Measurement instruments 
41 Descriptive statistics have been used as an essential tool to evaluate the overall summary of a set
42 
43 of data. Moreover, we have run the Pearson correlation to show the relationship and check 
44 
multicollinearity among the variables. Multicollinearity is a process in which one predictor 
46 
47 variable can be linearly estimated from the other with a significant degree of precision in a multiple 
48 regression model. High multicollinearity can bias a model. We have also used the variance
49 
inflation factor (VIF) to confirm whether the multicollinearity problem exists in our data. Then, 
51 
52 we run the OLS regression to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the level of 
53 compliance with IFSB-4. We have also run some additional models to test the robustness of our 54 
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used alternative variables of BIG4, ROE, and DEBT respectively to check the baseline model's 
robustness. Finally, a two-stage SLS was run to check the endogeneity issue of the study. We have 
used STATA to have run these instruments. 
4. Findings and analysis
4.1 Compliance with Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) standard -4 
Table 3 shows the percentage of yearly and average compliance scores. The average score reveals 
that the Islamic banks in Bangladesh differ in complying with IFSB standard- 4. The IBBL scored 
54.76 percent (the highest) average compliance score, whereas the FSIBL scored 37.59 percent 
(the lowest). The overall compliance score of IFSB standard- 4 over the six years is below half of 
the total items (44.83 percent). However, the findings provided that the overall IFSB standard-4 
disclosure and compliance score of Islamic banks are not sufficient, though each bank's 
compliance level is increasing over the years. The banks' management may emphasize more 
disclosing information in the annual report, resulting in improving the compliance score. 
Moreover, the regulatory authority may design and implement the strategic policy that instigates 
the banks to disclose and comply with international standards like IFSB. 
Table 3: Total Compliance Score in % 
International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 
Serial
no. Bank 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average 
1 IBBL 51.88 54.14 54.89 54.89 55.64 57.14 54.76 
2 SIBL 45.11 45.86 46.62 48.12 48.12 48.12 46.99 
3 AIBL 39.85 42.86 42.86 45.86 46.62 46.62 44.11 
4 FSIBL 32.33 37.59 37.59 39.1 39.1 39.85 37.59 
5 EXIM 41.35 41.35 41.35 42.86 42.86 44.36 42.36 
6 ICBL 40.6 45.86 46.62 48.12 48.12 46.62 45.99 
7 SJIBL 37.59 39.1 41.35 42.11 45.11 46.62 41.98 
Average 41.25 43.82 44.47 45.86 46.51 47.05 44.83 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics in which the number of observations used in the study is 42 
for 7 Islamic banks over a period of six years. The average score of total compliance level (TCS) 
12 
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with IFSB-4 is 60. The average size of the board member of the Islamic banks is 15, of which the 
independent member is only 3. It means the independence of the board is questionable. The high 
standard deviation of the board size (4.04) and independent board member (1.52) indicate a high 
variation among the sample banks. Unfortunately, the number of financial experts is insignificant
(0.86) in Islamic banks. As the banks have a separate audit committee, they may not be interested
in keeping more accounting experts; it is costly. Moreover, concerning the audit committee's size, 
the average number of audit committee members is 5 (mean: 4.57). Concerning the ownership 
structure, the director holds the highest percentage of shares (33.7%) while foreign and 
institutional owners' possession is only 14.04 and 14.95 percent respectively. This result implies 
that the directors' owners have a chance to influence the business's decision-making process 
because of playing a dual role as both the owner and manager at the same time. Interestingly, the 
standard deviation of ROA (1.51%) and LEV (26.5%) is greater than that of their mean value of 
0.39% and 20.22% respectively. These figures indicate a more significant variation in the financial 
performance among the Islamic banks. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (2013-2018) 
International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 
Variables  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TCS 42 60.05 6.71 50 76 
ROA 42 0.39 1.51 -4.76 2.36 
ROE 42 10.06 3.83 0.63 16.16 
DG 42 12.28 9.17 -7.56 30.81 
LEV 42 20.22 26.05 4.24 95.03 
DEBT 42 11.79 1.23 9.07 13.60 
FS 42 14.04 23.02 0 52.98 
IS 42 14.95 9.77 0 46.7 
DS 42 33.70 14.60 0 51.28 
AE 42 0.86 1.39 0 8 
AC 42 4.57 0.94 3 6 
BS 42 15.17 4.04 7 20 
IBM 42 2.98 1.52 1 8 
BIG4 42 0.14 0.35 0 1 
SSC 42 8.31 3.17 4 13 
SIZE 42 12.09 1.20 9.34 13.81 
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4.3 Correlation Analysis  
Table 5 presents the Pearson correlations among the variables. The compliance level of IFSB 
standard-4 (TCS) is positively correlated with size of the Shari`ah supervisory committee (SSC) 
(0.365, p<0.01); firm size (SIZE) (0.261, p<0.1); board size (BS) (0.263, p<0.1); independent
board member (0.42, p<0.01); accounting experts (AE) (0.631, p<0.01); audit quality (BIG4) 
(0.489, p<0.01); and foreign ownership (FS) (0.703, p<0.01). However, the TCS is negatively 
correlated with directors' shares (DS) (-0.51, p<0.01). The findings of correlation provide that the 
larger the firm's size, board, Shari'ah supervisory committee, the higher the board independence, 
greater the audit quality, more the financial experts in the board and more the percentage of foreign 
owners in the Islamic banks comply with the IFSB standard-4. On the contrary, director ownership 
reduces the level of TCS. 
Table 5: Pairwise correlation 
TCS ROA DG SIZE LEV BIG4 FS IS DS AE BS IBM SSC 
TCS 1 
ROA 0.008 1 
DG -0.041 0.563*** 1 
SIZE 0.261* 0.750*** 0.510*** 1 
LEV 0.05 -0.869*** -0.510*** -0.819*** 1 
BIG4 0.489*** 0.108 0.040 0.370* -0.115 1 
FS 0.703*** -0.471*** -0.407*** -0.223 0.439*** 0.197 1 
IS 0.018 0.135 0.189 0.046 -0.052 -0.036 -0.197 1 
DS -0.507*** 0.695*** 0.580*** 0.552*** -0.695*** -0.020 -0.787*** 0.172 1 
AE 0.631*** -0.119 -0.211 0.249 0.054 0.538*** 0.461*** -0.008 -0.308** 1 
BS 0.263* 0.676*** .335** 0.711*** -0.611*** 0.494*** -0.248 -0.13 0.501*** 0.204 1 
IBM 0.42*** 0.425*** 0.25 0.743*** -0.533*** 0.459*** 0.146 -0.151 0.176 0.298* 0.548*** 1 
SSC 0.365** 0.509*** 0.174 0.535*** -0.51*** 0.112 -0.018 -0.082 0.218 0.094 0.61*** 0.538*** 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.4 Multicollinearity problem 
Before further analysis, the study investigates the multicollinearity problem among the variables. 
Table 5 provides that the highest correlation coefficient between leverage and ROA is 0.869, which 
is less than the threshold of 0.90 (Black et al., 2010), meaning that there is no collinearity issue in 
the study. Furthermore, the variance inflation factor (VIF) presented in Table 6 shows that all the 
14 
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values are below the threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 1984), meaning that the study is free from
multicollinearity issues. 
Table 6. Regression (OLS) results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VIF TCS TCS TCS TCS TCS 































































































































N 42 42 42 42 42 
F 23.326 21.290 23.049 27.289 20.731 
r2 0.915 0.932 0.923 0.927 0.915 
r2_a 0.876 0.888 0.883 0.893 0.871 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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1 
2 
3 4.5 Regression results
4 
The empirical results in Table 6 present the impact of corporate governance on compliance with 
6 
7 IFSB standard-4. Under the baseline model, the study examines the predicted effect of the Shari'ah 
8 
9 supervisory committee, board characteristics, and ownership structure on the compliance of IFSB 
standard-4. Column 1 shows a significant and positive relationship of SSC (0.38, p<0.05), board 
11 
12 size (0.74, p<0.01) and accounting experts in the board (0.96, p<0.05) with IFSB standard-4. In 
13 
contrast, independent board members and audits show an insignificant effect. Concerning the 14 
16 
effect of ownership structure, the study found the positive and significant impact of foreign 
17 ownership (0.12, p<0.01) and institutional ownership (0.12, p<0.01) on IFSB standard-4, whereas
18 
19 directors' ownership (-0.29, p<0.01) affects negatively. 
21 
22 Furthermore, the study investigated the effect of financial performance, leverage and size of the 
23 
24 banks as control variables on IFSB standard-4 and found an insignificant effect of ROA while the 
26 deposit growth, another financial performance indicator, has a significant and positive impact on 
27 the TCS of IFSB standard-4. However, the study did not record any significant effect of firm size 28 
29 and leverage on the TCS of the IFSB standard. These results are also consistent with the findings 
31 of Azid & Alnodel (2019). 
32 
33 
34 4.6 Additional analyses for robustness 
36 Further, the study analyzed additional tests using alternative variables to check the robustness of 
37 
38 the baseline model. First, the size of the audit committee in column 2 of Table 6 is an alternative 
39 variable of BIG4. The findings are almost similar to the baseline model except for a significant
41 and positive relationship between ROA and TCS of IFSB standard-4. Second, B. Third, DEBT has 
42 
43 been used as an alternative variable of leverage; we did not find any significant difference in the 
44 
results between the baseline model and column 4. Finally, in column 5, dropping the board size 
46 
47 
from the baseline model, the study found similar results except for the significant relationship 
48 between BIG4 and TSC of IFSB standard. The result provides an insight that the higher the audit 
49 
quality, the higher the level of compliance of the IFSB standard, only if the board of directors 
51 
reduces their control over the audit committee. Overall, the additional models confirm the baseline 52 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.7 Endogeneity issue 
Finally, to fix potential endogeneity problems, the study runs the two-stage least-square (2SLS) 
regression. Prior research indicates that most corporate governance mechanisms are endogenous 
17 
International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 
Table 7. First and Second stage two SLS regression models 
1 2 
First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
SSC TCS BS TCS 






𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑡 ― 1 0.787*** 
(0.109) 

































































































N 35 35 35 35 
r2 0.859 0.962 0.922 0.958 
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1 
2 
3 as companies choose the board or members of sub-committees to match their business activities 
4 
and environment (Basiruddin & Ahmed, 2019; Grassa et al., 2018; Katmon et al., 2019). To 
6 
7 examine the presence of endogeneity, we run Durbin and Wu–Hausman tests in line with the study 
8 
9 of Basiruddin & Ahmed (2019) and Katmon et al. (2019). The results suggest that SSC 
(Durbin=8.55, p value=0.00; Wu-Hausman=6.47, p value= 0.02, F-test=0.00) and BS
11 
12 (Durbin=8.04, p value=0.01; Wu-Hausman=5.66, p value= 0.03, F-test=0.00) are found under the 
13 
endogeneity bias. To address the issue, the study selects a one-year lagged value of SSC and BS, 14 
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑡 ― 1 and 𝐵𝑆𝑡 ― 1  respectively, as the IVs consistent with the study of Katmon et al. (2019). 16 
17 
18 
19 The study used the endogenous variable as dependent and other exogenous variables and IV as the 
21 independent in the first stage. We have then had a fitted value of the endogenous variable, which 
22 
23 
is further replaced with the endogenous variable (lagged data) in the second stage. The first stage 
24 regression of column 1 and column 2 of Table 7 demonstrates that the instrumental lagged values 
26 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑡 ― 1 and 𝐵𝑆𝑡 ― 1 are highly significant in the current year of SSC and BS respectively. In the 
27 
28 second stage under both the model, when the study used the fitted value of SSC and BS derived 
29 from the first stage, the study found a significant and positive impact on IFSB disclosure. 
31 Moreover, in column 1, the results of IBM, BIG4, and firm size have been changed from the 
32 
33 baseline model. IBM shows a negative impact, while BIG4 and firm size demonstrates a positive 
34 
effect on the level of compliance with the IFSB standard. Furthermore, in the second stage of 
36 column 2, when 2SLS was run, the study found similar results of column 1 of Table 6 except the 
37 
38 insignificant effect of SSC and negative impact of IBM on IFSB standard-4.  
39 
41 
42 Further, we used F-statistics for the first stage 2SLS regression and found the cut-off point is more 
43 than the threshold of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1994). Therefore, the study concludes that the study's 
44 
IVs are reliable and valid for 2SLS regression. Moreover, the findings of the 2SLS are almost 
46 






54 Consistent with prior studies, the study found a positive relationship between SSC and IFSB 
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1 
2 
3 al., 2018). The findings imply that the larger the Shari'ah supervisor committee in Islamic banks, 
4 
the higher compliance with IFSB standard-4. SSC's existence in the Islamic banks ensures the 
6 
7 disclosure of the Shari'ah compliance, corporate governance, different types of risks, and 
8 
9 mitigating the risks. Moreover, they can improve the banks' monitoring capacity with accounting 
experts and Shari'ah scholars, thereby leading to higher compliance with the IFSB standards. As a 
11 
12 greater number of SSC provides more effective monitoring and more consistent Shari'ah rules and 
13 
principles, the study suggests the policymakers may extend the SSC; which, in turn, expects to 14 
16 
increase the compliance level of IFSB standard. 
17 
18 
19 Similarly, a positive relationship between board size and IFSB standards-4 implies that the larger 
the board size of the banks could help to increase higher the corporate disclosure level; the larger 21 
22 board has an opportunity to accumulate diversified experts from different areas of knowledge
23 
24 (Grassa et al., 2018). The study suggests the banks' management keeps the board size to a 
26 significant extent; it helps the banks disclose more information in their annual reports to increase 
27 compliance with IFSB standard-4. It should also be kept in mind that too large a board size needs 28 
29 colossal maintenance cost and less effective sometimes due to long coordinating time (Basiruddin 
31 & Ahmed, 2019). 
32 
33 
34 Unlike the board size, the study found an insignificant impact of board independence on TCS of  
36 IFSB standard; this result supports the prior research of Grassa et al. (2018) and Zalata et al. (2018). 
37 
38 The independent board members are expected to contribute to the board by neutral monitoring the 
39 management activities, resulting in quality accounting disclosures (Jahid et al., 2020. But, in 
41 Bangladesh, most independent board members are appointed from non-bankers and academicians 
42 
43 with political consideration who have no practical banking experience. Therefore, the Islamic
44 
banks and regulatory bodies are suggested to appoint independent directors who have specialized 
46 
47 
knowledge and experience, not considering the political background. 
48 
49 Additionally, a positive and significant relationship between the accounting experts on the board 
51 and IFSB standard-4 provides insight that the accounting expert in the board of directors oversees
52 
53 the audit committee role, resulting in increased compliance with IFSB-4. Therefore, the findings 
54 
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1 
2 
3 analysts in the board as much as possible to ensure information transparency, monitor financial 
4 
reporting strategies, and comply with international standards (Armstrong et al., 2015). 
6 
7 However, while examining the impact of audit quality on the level of compliance with IFSB-4, we8 
9 found an insignificant effect. The result is inconsistent with the prior studies as they revealed that 
11 the audit quality (BIG4) could influence the quality of information disclosure (Grassa, 2016;
12 
13 Katmon et al., 2019). In Bangladesh, only two Islamic banks have recently adopted external 
14 auditors from BIG4 Company, while other Islamic banks are still ignoring BIG4. Most auditors 
16 are appointed from internal board members who serve the purposes of the management. Therefore,
17 
18 the findings suggest that the policymakers of the Islamic banks of Bangladesh audit their financial 
19 
and non-financial operations by BIG4 company auditors. 
21 
22 Concerning the effect of ownership structure on the compliance with IFSB-4, the findings offer an 
23 
24 insight that the Islamic banks with a larger number of foreign and institutional ownership have a 
26 higher tendency to comply with international standards. These findings support the study of Mi 
27 Choi et al. (2012). On the other hand, a negative relationship between directors' ownership and 
28 
29 compliance with IFSB standard-4 indicates that they have constrained the information disclosure 
31 as they are powerful owners and managers and influence the board of directors to secure personal 
32 benefits. Supporting the finding of Chen et al. (2008), this study shows that the opportunity to have 33 
34 ownership and management motivates them to protect their self-interest, which results in 
36 insufficient disclosure and inadequate compliance with the international accounting standards. In 
37 
38 Bangladesh, since directors hold most of the shares, they often exercise excessive pressure over 
39 firms' management to attain more unethical benefits that go against others. Thus, the study 
41 provides insight that the higher the presence of foreign and institutional ownership and the lower 
42 
43 the presence of directors' ownership, the higher the quality of information disclosure and higher 
44 
compliance with international standards like IFSB-4. 
46 
47 
48 Among the control variables, the positive and significant impact of ROA and deposit growth 
49 
indicate that Islamic banks with higher financial performance disclose more information and 
51 
52 comply more with IFSB standards (Grassa et al., 2018; Muttakin et al., 2015). The findings also 
53 support the prior study of Muttakin et al. (2015), who documented similar results and explained 
54 
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1 
2 
3 signal in the market that they are in a better position compared to others to attract more customers. 
4 
This competition leads the Islamic banking industry to comply with international standards like 
6 
7 IFSB standard-4. On the contrary, the insignificant effect of firm size and leverage on IFSB 
8 
9 standard indicates that Islamic banks under pressure do not work well to disclose more information 







17 Though it is expected that Islamic banks will comply with most of the aspects stated in IFSB 
18 
19 financial accounting standards, but it is observed that the overall compliance status is not 
satisfactory. Of seven sample banks, only one bank (IBBL) complied more than 50%, while the21 
22 average compliance percentage is only 44.83%. IBBL shows the highest compliance score as it is 
23 
24 a member of both AAOIFI and IFSB. Therefore, regulators in Bangladesh should encourage
26 Islamic banks to get AAOIFI and IFSB membership to improve their compliance status. 
27 
28 
Further, the study investigates whether the corporate governance of Islamic banks of Bangladesh 29 
can affect the level of compliance with IFSB standard-4. The findings call for relevant 
31 
32 stakeholders, academicians, management policymakers, practitioners, the Shari'ah council, and 
33 
34 regulatory bodies to improve the corporate governance practices of Islamic banks and the level of 
36 compliance with IFSB standard-4. More specifically, first, the study opens an avenue for directing 
37 the researchers in investigating the accounting and reporting status of Islamic banking, considering 
38 
39 the requirements of international standards. Second, the study suggests the banks enlarge their 
41 Shari'ah supervisory committee and board of directors and include the accounting experts on the 
42 
43 
boards to a significant extent to enhance the level of compliance with IFSB standards. Third, the 
44 board should reduce control over the audit committee. Otherwise, it will impede the audit 
46 committee from working freely, resulting in a reduction in the level of compliance with accounting 
47 standards. Fourth, the regulators should increase the proportion of foreign and institutional 48 
49 ownership as the foreign and institutional owners influence management in disclosing more quality 
51 information, which results in higher compliance with IFSB standards (Mi Choi et al. (2012); (Sami 
52 
53 and Zhou, 2004). On the other hand, the regulatory bodies and management should reduce the 
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2 
3 regulatory and supervisory structure for Islamic banks for their effective functioning following 
4 
Shari'ah principles, we recommend establishing an independent regulatory body to support the 
6 
7 emerging Islamic banking sector in Bangladesh to make them more accountable and assist them 
8 
9 in flourishing based on Shari'ah precepts. Finally, Bangladeshi regulators should harmonize the 
AAOIF  and IFSB standards with other reporting regulations (Ullah, 2014). 
11 
12 
13 The study results should be used carefully as it considered only the Islamic banks in Bangladesh 
14 because the IFSB standards were formulated only for Islamic banks; therefore, other banks are not 
16 supposed to come under the orbit of this standard. To get the most current picture, the study used 
17 
18 the annual reports of the sample Islamic banks of 2013-2018 only and these reports were taken as 
19 
the basis of evaluating the level of compliance with IFSB-4. The study expects to benefit the
21 
22 
stakeholders in evaluating and selecting a Shari'ah-compliant bank. Finally, the study expects more 
23 studies in examining the impact of bank attributes and corporate governance on the compliance of 
24 
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